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ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFTER
NAFTA
SANFORD E. GAINES*
Early in 1991, President Bush sought from Congress an extension of
the authorization to negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)1 with Canada and Mexico under the "fast track" procedure.2
During Congress's consideration of this request, members of Congress
and environmental organizations raised concerns about the potential effect
of liberalized trade on the environment. In part, those concerns arose
from uncertainty about the effect of increased trade flows between the
United States and Mexico on environmental conditions along the U.S.-
Mexico border and in Mexico. With respect to environmental effects in
the United States, the chief concern was that the new trade agreement
would compel a lowering of U.S. environmental standards, or would
impose restraints on federal, state, and local laws and programs for
environmental protection in the name of free trade.
On May 1, 1991, President Bush transmitted to Congress the Admin-
istration's response3 to the issues that had come up in the fast track
extension debate, specifically including environmental concerns. This ar-
ticle describes the implementation of the commitments made on May 1,
1991, with regard to environmental laws and regulations in the United
States after NAFTA. 4
Three commitments that President Bush made on environmental issues
relate directly to the topic of U.S. environmental laws and regulations.
First, the President committed to take steps to understand better the
relationship between trade and the environment and to ensure that en-
* Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for the Environment, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Washington, D.C. This article does not necessarily represent the official views of
the U.S. Trade Representative or the U.S. Government.
1. Dec. 17, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. The President notified Congress of his decision to open free trade negotiations with Mexico
on September 25, 1990. On February 5, 1991, the President notified Congress of the decision of
Mexico, the United States, and Canada to broaden the negotiations to all three countries, and thus
to work toward a North American Free Trade Agreement. The Trade Act of 1974, section 151,
establishes a procedure for negotiated trade agreements to be submitted by the President to the
Congress for implementation under fast track procedures. Because the 1991 deadline for submitting
agreements under the fast track procedure was approaching, President Bush needed to request an
extension of time for negotiating NAFTA.
3. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a
North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter Response] (transmitted to the Congress by the
President, May 1, 1991).
4. On December 17, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada, President Salinas of Mexico,
and President Bush signed the "North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
Mexican States." Citations to NAFTA provisions are to the text as signed; earlier publicly-released
versions had different article numbers in some chapters and sections, and contain slightly different
wording in some places.
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vironmental issues were taken fully into account in the NAFTA nego-
tiations. Second, the President promised to explore and understand the
possible environmental effects of NAFTA. Third, the President pledged
that nothing in NAFTA would weaken U.S. environmental laws or di-
minish the right of the United States to protect health, safety, and the
environment.5 The process of negotiating NAFTA and the Agreement
itself fulfill each of these critical commitments.
I. COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATIONS INTO THE NEGOTIATION OF NAFTA
In order to understand better the relationship between trade agreements
and protection of the environment and to ensure that environmental
condition.- were taken fully into account in the NAFTA negotiations,
President Bush made two specific commitments. One pledge was to include
representatives of non-governmental environmental organizations into the
trade policy advisory structure; the other was to make sure that U.S.
government officials with environmental regulatory responsibilities and
expertise participated in the negotiation of environment-related provisions.
The appointment of non-governmental environmental representatives to
the trade policy advisory committees was done promptly during the
summer and fall of 1991. The trade policy advisory committees, which
are mandated by statute, include hundreds of representatives of various
economic and government sectors affected by trade policy. At the apex
of this system is the President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy
and Negotiations. Under this presidentially-appointed committee are five
policy advisory committees to the U.S. Trade Representative for each
major sectoral interest: Industry, Agriculture, Services, Investment, and
Intergovernmental. President Bush appointed Russell Train, the Chairman
of the World Wildlife Fund and former administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, to the presidential advisory committee. U.S.
Trade Representative Carla Hills appointed similarly prominent environ-
mental leaders to her policy advisory committees: John Sawhill, President
and CEO of the Nature Conservancy and former Secretary of Energy
(Industry); Peter Berle, President of the National Audubon Society (Ag-
riculture); John Adams, Executive Director of the Natural Resources
Defense Council (Services); Jay Hair, President of the National Wildlife
Federation (Investment); and James Strock, Secretary for Environmental
Protection of the State of California (Intergovernmental).
The environmental advisors have provided extraordinary service to the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), and have played an
5. Response, supra note 3. The other environmental commitments related to environmental
conditions in Mexico and along the Mexico-U.S. border. These commitments were fully satisfied,
if not exceeded, through studies of environmental law and regulation in Mexico, joint development
of the Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area, and cooperative efforts
between the governments of Mexico and the United States on a variety of environmental regulatory,
enforcement, education, and improvement programs.
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instrumental role, as expected, in increasing awareness of the relationships
between trade and the environment. During the NAFTA negotiations,
they were consulted closely. They had several meetings with Ambassador
Carla Hills personally; they or their senior staff representatives had
numerous additional meetings with USTR staff. It is no secret that these
consultations with the environmental advisors helped shape the negotiation
of several of the environment-related provisions of the Agreement.
The other aspect of integrating trade and environment policy in the
NAFTA process was to include U.S. regulatory agency experts in the
development and negotiation of the United States' NAFTA objectives.
Officials from the departments of agriculture, energy, and transportation
were included on appropriate negotiating teams. The Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service and the Food and Drug Administration, which
are responsible for agricultural, livestock, and food safety inspections at
the border, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, with its broad
responsibilities for pesticides, toxic substances, and hazardous wastes,
among others, were even more closely involved with EPA officials co-
chairing some of the negotiating teams.
II. COMMITMENT TO REVIEW ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
RELATED TO NAFTA
The second commitment on environmental issues that President Bush
made on May 1, 1991, was to have his Administration undertake a review
of potential environmental issues that could arise from the negotiation
and implementation of a North American trade liberalization agreement.
The USTR began work on that review immediately. It assembled a group
of eleven federal agencies with expertise in various environmental issues
to conduct portions of the review. At an early stage of the work, USTR
sought public input by publishing a notice of the review in the Federal
Register. In addition, USTR conducted public hearings on the environ-
mental review in six cities while the first draft was still in preparation.
On October 17, 1991, USTR released over 3,000 copies of a draft of
the review for public comment. Numerous comments, some very detailed,
were received. Taking the comments into consideration, USTR and the
interagency group revised the draft and published a final report on
February 25, 1992.6
The review of environmental issues served several important purposes.
First, it focused the attention of numerous government agencies on
potential environmental issues at the very earliest stage of developing
U.S. negotiating objectives for NAFTA. Second, it prompted the collection
and analysis of data relating to environmental issues that enabled U.S.
negotiators to focus on specific topics of potential concern with a concrete
understanding of the possible consequences for the environment. Third,
it stimulated an early public discussion of the issues of most significant
6. Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues (USTR Feb. 25, 1992).
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concern from an environmental point of view. Finally, it led to the
formulation, in the final report, of recommendations for negotiating
objectives for the United States just as the negotiators were beginning
to get into detailed discussions.
III. COMMITMENT NOT TO WEAKEN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The President's third commitment to Congress was that NAFTA would
not weaken U.S. environmental laws or diminish America's right to protect
the environment, health, and safety. To understand how the Adminis-
tration fulfilled this commitment, we need to examine the environmental
provisions of NAFTA itself.
A. Preamble and Objectives
The Preamble of NAFTA enumerates a variety of trade liberalization
policies the parties intend to promote. For example, they resolve "to
create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced
in their territories," and to "ensure a predictable commercial framework
for business planning and investment." ' 7 Because of environmental con-
cerns, however, the preamble conditions the efforts of the parties toward
those policy goals with a further resolve "to undertake each ... in a
manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation." '
The Preamble then sets forth additional purposes for NAFTA, including
the resolve to "promote sustainable development" and to "strengthen
the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."
It is noteworthy that these latter two purposes are declared independently
from the trade p-.-motion purposes that motivate NAFTA. The parties
thus recognize that sustainable development is an objective unto itself
that can, and should, be fostered through closer economic ties and the
concomitant enhancement of political cooperation. Similarly, the strength-
ening of environmental protection efforts is seen as a separate but com-
plementary commitment that supports the broader purposes of economic
collaboration.
Chapter 1 of NAFTA, titled "Objectives," contains Article 104, which
governs the relationship between NAFTA and important environmental
treaty obligations that the parties have undertaken or expect to undertake.
The purpose of Article 104 is to ensure that NAFTA, as a later-in-time
international commitment of the three governments, is not construed to
impair their rights to fulfill obligations through trade measures required
by prior international environmental agreements. 9 The three international
7. NAFTA, supra note 1, Preamble.
8. Id.
9. Article 104 specifically allows the NAFTA parties, by an exchange of letters, to extend the
coverage of the article to trade measures in other international agreements that one or more parties
may enter into in the future.
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environmental agreements named in the article-the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,' 0 the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer," and
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal"-are the three most prominent
examples of environmental agreements that depend in whole or in part
on trade restrictions to achieve their environmental objectives.
In the case of the endangered species convention, international trade
in specimens is the very environmental threat to be controlled. The
Montreal Protocol obligates the parties to restrict trade in ozone-depleting
substances with other parties and with non-parties to ensure that the
agreed-upon reductions in the production and use of the controlled
substances are not circumvented by imports or exports to countries not
meeting their treaty obligations. The Basel Convention sets conditions
on imports and exports of hazardous waste to ensure that they are
disposed of in an environmentally sound manner.
In each case, there is some potential that the trade restrictions imposed
to fulfill the environmental objectives of these agreements might be
inconsistent with the trade rules set forth in NAFTA. Article 104 provides
that, in the event of any such inconsistency, the international environ-
mental obligations shall prevail over NAFTA. 3
B. Agricultural Products and Food Safety Standards
NAFTA contains detailed provisions on the application of so-called
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are measures adopted and
applied primarily to protect animals or plants from pests or disease, or
to protect humans from risks from additives, contaminants, or organisms
in foods and beverages.14 Examples of sanitary and phytosanitary measures
include inspections of meat processing facilities, quarantines of products
arriving from infested areas, health-based prohibitions on particular food
additives, and the adoption and enforcement of pesticide residue tolerances
for specific crops and pesticides for domestic and imported fruits and
vegetables.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are essential for the protection
of human health and the environment, but they are also open to abuse
10. Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (Washington, D.C.; as amended June 22, 1979).
11. Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (Montreal; as amended June 29, 1990).
12. Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (Basel). Note that the United States has not yet ratified the
Basel Convention, although many of our domestic legal requirements are consistent with the Con-
vention. Because Basel is not in effect for the United States, Article 104 also refers to bilateral
agreements that the United States has with both Canada and Mexico governing import and export
of hazardous wastes.
13. NAFTA Article 104(l) contains a proviso that, if a party has a choice among equally effective
and reasonably available trade measures, the environmental obligation will prevail only if the party
selects that measure that is the "least inconsistent" with its NAFTA obligations.
14. NAFTA Article 724 defines sanitary and phytosanitary measures to include as well measures
to protect animals from contaminated feed, to protect humans from disease-causing organisms or
pests in animals or plants or animal or plant products, and to protect or limit other damage from
the introduction, establishment, or spread of a pest.
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as a means of protecting specific agricultural sectors from competition
by imported products. Thus, trade agreements must strike a balance
between assuring ample authority of importing countries to protect health
and the environment, while imposing some scientific and procedural
discipline to prevent the adoption of measures for purely protectionist
purposes. In striking that balance in NAFTA, the United States had to
keep in mind the President's commitment that the Agreement would not
impair the right of the United States to protect the environment, health,
and safety. The provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures ul-
timately agreed to in NAFTA follow the same basic outline as the
corresponding provisions under negotiation in the Uruguay Round of
negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 5 but contain
a number of significant differences that make the text clearer and more
precise.
Perhaps the most important basic issue that arises with respect to
sanitary and phytosanitary measures is whether countries may adopt
differing standards or measures based on differing circumstances or pre-
ferences. For understandable reasons, the international trading community
prefers that countries adopt international standards when such standards
have been established. For equally understandable reasons, national gov-
ernments and interest groups also want to maintain a substantial degree
of autonomy to set their own standards.
The NAFTA text favors national autonomy over international standards.
It provides explicitly that each party may apply measures necessary for
the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health in its territory
that are more stringent than international standards. 6 It also provides
that, in protecting human, animal, or plant life or health, each party
may "establish its appropriate levels of protection" through a risk as-
sessment process."1 This assures that the United States can adopt measures
that are intended to achieve a higher level of health or environmental
protection than the other parties. If we arrive at that level of protection
through a risk assessment process, that process should meet certain basic
requirements. Since U.S. agricultural protection and food safety standards
are set under statutes and administrative procedures that include assess-
ments of risk, these provisions adequately protect U.S. standards legit-
imately adopted and applied.
NAFTA does not ignore international standards. The parties' agreement
to use relevant international standards is a "basis" for their own measures,
with the objective of adopting equivalent or identical measures. Even
that commitment is qualified, however, by a general principle that in-
15. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, UR-91-0185, GATT Secretariat (Dec. 20, 1991) (often referred to as the "Dunkel Text"
because it was compiled by Arthur Dunkel, the Secretary General of GATT). At the time of this
writing, the Uruguay Round negotiations have not concluded, so the Dunkel Draft remains a draft.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712(1).
17. id. art. 712(2).
18. Id. art 713(1).
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ternational standards should be used "without reducing the level of
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health." 19 Moreover, the
next paragraph of the text reasserts a broad scope for national standards
stricter than international ones, providing that a national measure that
achieves a level of protection different from the level of protection under
an international measure "shall not for that reason alone be presumed
to be inconsistent with this section." 2 0
The broad scope for national autonomy under NAFTA is not, of
course, free from any discipline. NAFTA identifies four separate disci-
plines on any sanitary and phytosanitary measure. First, it must be based
on scientific principles, and should not be maintained where there is no
longer a scientific basis for it.21 Second, a measure should not "arbitrarily
or unjustifiably" discriminate between like goods where similar conditions
prevail. That is, a measure against a food contaminant should apply to
domestic food and food imports from each country equally, unless there
is some difference in circumstance to justify differing treatment. 2 Third,
in order to prevent "unnecessary obstacles" to trade, measures should
be applied "only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate level
of protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility." 23
Finally, measures may not be adopted or applied with the intent or effect
of creating a disguised restriction on trade.24
Some environmental critics of NAFTA have raised questions about the
unnecessary obstacles to trade discipline. 25 Focusing on the word "nec-
essary" in the phrase "only to the extent necessary to achieve its ap-
propriate level of protection," they argue that this discipline imports
GATT interpretations of "necessity" that can be read to require a country
to avoid a trade restricting measure if non-trade-restrictive or less trade
restrictive alternatives can accomplish the same end.26 This approach to
the NAFTA text, however, ignores the context and clear meaning of the
entire phrase. NAFTA, as we have seen, grants broad authority for each
party to determine the level of protection from a particular risk that it
wishes to achieve (including zero risk). A hypothetical example may help
to clarify the intent of the parties.
Let us assume that the United States EPA has determined that it wants
to achieve a risk level of one-in-a-million lifetime risk of cancer from
a particular pesticide used on strawberries. Let us further assume that
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 713(2).
21. Id. art 712(3).
22. Id. art. 712(4).
23. Id. art. 712(5).
24. Id. art. 712(6).
25. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Comm. on Science, Space & Tech., 102nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., -(1992) (statement of David A. Wirth).
26. One GATT case that advances such an interpretation is Thailand-Restrictions on Importation
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD/37S/200, at 222-23 (Nov. 7, 1990). For a criticism
of this case, asserting that it incorrectly interprets the GATT, see Charnovitz, GA TT and the
Environment: Examining the Issues, 4 INT'L ENVrL. AFi. 203, 212-14 (1992).
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the scientific data shows that a level of five parts per million of the
pesticide on the strawberries will yield a cancer risk of one-in-a-million
with some margin of safety. If EPA sets the pesticide residue tolerance
at five parts per million, that measure is clearly being applied "only to
the extent necessary" to achieve the one-in-a-million risk level, and should
withstand any challenge under this provision.
If we assume instead that EPA decides to set the pesticide residue
tolerance at one part per million, Mexico, which exports strawberries to
the U.S. market, may have a basis for complaining that the U.S. measure
is an unnecessary obstacle to trade because it is adopted or applied
beyond the extent necessary to achieve the chosen level of risk. This is
very different from an argument that a pesticide residue tolerance at any
level is not "necessary" because alternative methods of protection may
be available.
Before leaving the subject of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, one
other major issue deserves attention. One of the disciplines on such
measures is that they be based on science. Exactly how that discipline
is phrased, however, became a matter of some significance to the en-
vironmental community. Following the release of the GATT "Dunkel
Text" Draft Final Act in December, 1991, environmental groups were
sharply critical of the phrase "scientific justification" with respect to the
requisite scientific foundation for a measure. The Dunkel Text contains
no definition of this important term. Lacking an agreed-upon definition,
the environmental and consumer protection communities argued that
"justification" implied a high standard of scientific support and expla-
nation for any measure.
Although USTR disagreed with the environmental groups' interpretation
of the term "scientific justification," we agreed to try to get the cor-
responding language defined or modified in the NAFTA text. As a result,
the NAFTA text requires that measures be "based on scientific principles"
and not be maintained where there is no longer a "scientific basis" for
it.27 The parties then agreed to define "scientific basis" to mean "a
reason based on data or information derived using scientific methods." '28
In this way, NAFTA still requires that measures be scientifically based
but avoids having the text-or dispute resolution panelists-require a
judgment between competing scientific theories or sets of information.
As long as a measure has a basis in science, the existence of competing
or alternative scientific analyses cannot be used to strike down a measure.
C. Other Product Standards
All product-related trade measures other than sanitary and phytosanitary
measures are governed by another chapter of NAFTA-Chapter 9 on
Standards-Related Measures. In broad terms, the standards-related meas-
ures provisions create similar rights and impose similar disciplines to
27. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 712(3)(a) & (b).
28. Id. art. 724.
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those just discussed for sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In some
of the details, however, certain important differences emerge.
To begin with, a party may establish a product standard for reasons
other than protection of human, animal, or plant life or health. Indeed,
NAFTA lists other objectives by way of illustration-including safety,
consumer protection, and sustainable development-but without limiting
the possibility of other "legitimate objectives." ' 29 Because some of the
possible legitimate objectives are not susceptible to scientific determination,
Chapter 9 imposes no requirement to conduct a risk assessment, though
it does provide minimum standards and procedures for conducting a risk
assessment if one is performed.30
Chapter 9 creates much the same right to establish levels of protection
that a nation considers "appropriate," 3 conditioned by similar disciplines
as to non-discrimination32 and the use of international standards as a
basis for standards-related measures.33 With respect to "unnecessary ob-
stacles to trade," however, the provision in Chapter 9 is sufficiently
different from the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Chapter to war-
rant attention. With respect to general product standards, NAFTA pro-
vides that an unnecessary obstacle to trade "shall not be deemed to be
created" where the measure has a demonstrable purpose to achieve a
legitimate objective and does not exclude goods of another party that
meet the legitimate objective.34
D. Provisions Governing Investment
Article 1114 of the Investment Chapter contains two provisions related
to environmental measures that ensure the maintenance and observance
of environmental laws and regulations in the United States. Paragraph
I of Article 1114 expressly authorizes the parties to place conditions on
investments for the purpose of environmental protection, provided only
that they apply such conditions in a nondiscriminatory manner to domestic
and foreign investors alike. This provision authorizes state governments,
for example, to continue to require the preparation of an environmental
impact assessment before approval of an investment activity.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1114 contains a more complex provision in
which the parties recognize that it is "inappropriate to encourage in-
vestment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures."
Accordingly, the parties agree that they should not "waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or derogate from, such measures as
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or re-
tention in its territory of an investment . . . ." If one party considers
that another has offered such encouragement to investors, this paragraph
29. Id. art. 915.
30. Id. arts. 904(2) & 907(2).
31. id. arts. 904(2) & 905(3).
32. Id. art. 904(3).
33. Id. art. 905(1).
34. Id. art. 904(4).
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provides for mandatory consultation "with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement."
Through this provision, NAFTA governments intend to discourage the
creation of "pollution havens" -regions in which lower environmental
standards or lax enforcement become inducements to the location of
heavily polluting facilities.
E. Dispute Resolution
The dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA are rather complex and
full of procedural detail.3 5 Reduced to its bare essentials, however, dispute
settlement will be a three-step process. First, the disputing parties must
consult with each other. 6 If consultations fail to resolve the matter, they
. . .4Iu iZAV^ u r auc Lom m sslon. If this also.... see the., good. Offices,, of the Free Tr de Co s  .. • 37
fails, then either party may request the formation of an arbitral panel.',
Most of the NAFTA text on dispute settlement deals with the operation
of the arbitral panels. Within these provisions are several that have specific
relevance to environmental matters.
The basic issue with respect to environmental issues as they may arise
in the context of a trade dispute is to ensure that the arbitral panels-
which will be composed primarily of trade experts-have access to and
receive advice from appropriate scientific or technical experts on the
environmental issues involved in the dispute. NAFTA provides two me-
chanisms for the panel to obtain the benefits of scientific expertise. The
first mechanism is for the panel to seek advice from any person or body
it deems appropriate (provided that the disputing parties agree and also
agree to terms and conditions for the panel's use of the experts).39 The
second mechanism is a more structured process by which the panel requests
a written report from a scientific review board composed of "highly
qualified, independent experts." 4 If a review board is established, the
parties get advance notice of, and an opportunity to comment on, the
review board's report. 41 The arbitral panel must take into account the
review board's report and any comments from the parties. 42
NAFTA has one novel feature specifically designed for disputes in-
volving product measures that raise factual issues concerning the envi-
ronment, or for measures where the responding party claims its actions
were undertaken pursuant to an international environmental agreement
under Article 104. Because the NAFTA provisions in several chapters
create rights or environmental safeguards that do not yet exist in the
35. Chapter 19 deals with dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
Chapter 20 establishes dispute settlement institutions and procedures for all other types of disputes.
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2006.
37. Id. art. 2007.
38. Id. art. 2008.
39. Id. art. 2014.
40. Id. art. 2015(2).
41. Id. art. 2015(3).
42. Id. art. 2015(4).
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GATT, there was reasonable cause for concern that claimants in trade
disputes involving environmental issues would bring their cases in the
GATT and thereby circumvent NAFTA's beneficial measures. Therefore,
the NAFTA parties agreed that in environmentally sensitive disputes, the
responding party should have the opportunity to compel the matter to
be heard under NAFTA auspices. 43 Because the responding party will be
the party defending the environmentally-based trade measure, this helps
to make sure that parties will have the most environmentally friendly
forum available to hear their views and render a decision applying NAFTA
principles and objectives.
Finally, it should be noted that both the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Chapter and the Standards-Related Measures Chapter expressly
provide that a party challenging a measure under either of those two
chapters has the burden of establishing the inconsistency of the measure
with NAFTA." This compares favorably with GATT, where resort to
Article XX as a legal basis for an environmental standard tends to shift
the burden to the party defending the measure to show that it qualifies
for one of the Article XX exceptions.
IV. CONCLUSION: A LOOK AT HOW TWO U.S
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ARE AFFECTED BY NAFTA
Two of the most cherished of U.S. health and environmental laws that
might have been affected by NAFTA are the Delaney Clause of the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 45 and Proposition 65 in California.46
Health and environmental protection measures taken under these laws
should readily survive any challenge under NAFTA.
The Delaney Clause provides that no substance that has been shown
to be an animal carcinogen may be deliberately added to food products
sold in the United States. As interpreted by the courts, the Delaney
Clause is absolute. For animal carcinogens, the law requires that no
amount, however slight the resulting risk, may be added to foods.
The Delaney Clause appears to meet all the NAFTA disciplines described
above. First, it has a scientific basis. There is substantial support in the
scientific and policy literature for a presumption that a substance that
causes cancer in an animal may also cause cancer in humans. Second,
in adopting the zero-risk approach of prohibiting the deliberate addition
of any animal carcinogens to the food supply, Congress determined that
the benefit to society of the food additives is not worth the additional
risk. This represents a bona fide choice of the appropriate level of risk
in comparison to other social goals and a determination of an appropriate
level of risk in pursuit of a public health objective. Third, the Delaney
43. Id. art. 2005(3) & (4).
44. Id. arts. 723(6) & 914(4).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (1993).
46. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25249.5 to .13 (West 1993).
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Clause is a measure that is clearly designed to achieve our chosen "ap-
propriate level of protection," and does not require measures beyond
those necessary to meet that level of protection. Finally, it applies equally
to all like products, whether domestic or imported and regardless of the
country of origin, so it is nondiscriminatory. Therefore, it appears that
the Delaney Clause, which the United States has been applying to imported
as well as to domestic foods for nearly thirty years without a trade
challenge, is no more likely to be challenged under NAFTA. If a dispute
were brought under NAFTA, the United States has arguments available
that should successfully turn back the challenge.
California's Proposition 65 requires consumer warnings at the point
of sale for virtually any product that contains carcinogenic or other toxic
substances. 47 Like the Delaney Clause, Proposition 65 is a consumer
protection as well as a public health measure. It has a scientific basis
and is administered through an agency and a series of advisory committees
that make risk assessment based determinations about whether and how
a particular substance must be labelled.4s Although the labeling require-
ments are different from-and generally considered more stringent than-
federal or international standards, they have survived preemption chal-
lenges under the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause, and
should readily withstand challenge under similar doctrines in international
trade law. As stringent and potentially onerous as Proposition 65 can
be, no plausible grounds for challenging it under NAFTA exist. It pursues
a legitimate objective; it operates on the basis of scientific principles;
and its labeling measures are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis.
The North American Free Trade Agreement and cooperative environ-
mental activities with Mexico related to NAFTA have fulfilled President
Bush's May 1, 1991, commitments. While more can perhaps be done to
strengthen cooperation on environmental programs with both Canada
and Mexico in parallel activities, NAFTA itself assures that the United
States and state and local governments can continue to adopt standard
legislative and administrative procedures, and apply firmly and fairly their
full arsenal of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.
47. Id. § 25249.6.
48. See id. § 25249.8(d). Typically the governor allows the California Health and Welfare Agency
to choose the members of the advisory committees. See Kenneth J. Shaffer, Improving California's
Safe Drinking Water and Enforcement Act Scientific Advisory Panel Through Regulatory Reform,
77 CAL. L. REv. 1211, 1217 (1989).
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PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE U.S-MEXICO
BORDER REGION
ALBERT E. UTTON*
This paper concerns the institutional arrangements for protecting the
environment in the border region. Basically, there are two positions. The
environmentalists say that, historically, the existing institutions in the
border region have failed to protect the environment adequately. This
has been a problem of "historical failure." In response, the governments
of Mexico and the United States have said, in effect, "If the institutions
ain't broke don't jettison them, just improve them."
What institutions, then, do we have? What proposals for change have
come out of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")'
negotiations? And what are the prospects? Who is going to win? What
institutions are we going to have? I will do a little bit of a crystal ball
projection.
On the question of what institutions exist, there are two major inter-
national institutions in the United States-Mexico border region for pro-
tecting the environment and managing natural resources: the International
Boundary and Water Commission2 and the Consultative Mechanism set
up under the 1983 La Paz Agreement.3 The International Boundary and
Water Commission ("Commission") is a mature institution. It has nearly
100 years of experience in managing the water resources shared by the
two countries and in dealing with sanitation and sewage problems in the
border region.
The Commission is mainly an engineering-oriented organization-a large
organization with lots of engineers at their drafting tables-located in
Juarez and El Paso. It has been most successful in measuring and
allocating the waters of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers and in
building large dams and hydroelectric facilities. It has been, and this is
arguable, reasonably successful in dealing with the sanitation problems
along the border. It has built international sewage treatment facilities at
places like Nogales, and is in the process of doing the same thing in
Nuevo Laredo, San Diego, and Tijuana. It is also operating on the new
river in Mexicali.
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque; Director, In-
ternational Transboundary Resources Center, New Mexico; Editor, Natural Resources Journal, New
Mexico; Author (with Teclaff) TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCEs LAW, 1987; Chair, U.S. Mexico Study
Group, Council on Foreign Relations; B.A. Juris, University of New Mexico; M.A Juris., Oxford
University (England); admitted to bars of England and New Mexico (1959).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
2. 22 U.S.C. §§ 277a, 277d-1 (1988).
3. United States-Mexico Agreement on the Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983,
U.S.-Mex., TIAS 10827 (signed at La Paz; entered into force Feb. 16, 1984).
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In all of these places, the Commission's engineers have only been
reasonably successful because they have not been able to keep up with
the growth along the border regions. In the words of the Mexican dicho,
they have been "corriendo y Ilegando tarde;" running but arriving late.
For example, the plant in Nogales was originally built for 26,000 people.
By the time it was built, however, there were 50,000 people in the region.
So the engineers rebuilt the plant for 50,000 people but by the time it
was completed there were 80,000 people. Now they have just done it
again; they built for 100,000, yet there are already well over 100,000
people in Los Ambos Nogales.
They have come under terrific fire from the environmental organizations
who have seen NAFTA as providing a leverage point, a window of
opportunity to improve the environmental conditions and the institutions
along the border. The environmental communities have had particular
problems with the Commission because it is composed of engineers rather
than lawyers. The engineers do not like, and are not accustomed to
dealing with, the public. They like to build dams; they do not like to
have hearings. This has been anathema to the environmental groups. We
hear the word "transparency" all the time in these border meetings. The
Commission is anything but transparent. It finds it extremely frustrating
to deal with the public, particularly with these environmental activists.
For the environmental groups, the Commission could be considered public
enemy number one.
The second institution is a consultative body established under the 1983
La Paz Agreement. 4 It was designed in La Paz, Baja California, in order
to bring the heads of the national environmental agencies of Mexico and
the United States together on a regular basis to consult, coordinate,
communicate, and develop harmonious environmental policies. The 1983
Agreement is an executive agreement between Presidents de la Madrid
and Reagan; it is not a treaty. It was not ratified by the Senate in the
United States or in Mexico.
The consultative body has been fairly successful in the areas of haz-
ardous waste, air quality, and emergency plans. It covers these matters
with a lot of hortatory language about communication and coordination,
but there is no binding environmental enforcement. Therefore, the en-
vironmental community has again been discontented with the international
institution.
In the case of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the
institution is too slow, too secretive; in the case of the 1983 La Paz
Agreement, there is too much talk and too little action. What have been
the proposals for change? For one thing, there has been an absolute
blizzard of proposals from the environmental community. I have press
releases from every environmental organization believable suggesting dif-
ferent types of treaties. The suggestions could fall into major categories.
The first suggestion is to diminish the authority of the Commission and
4. Id. art. 8.
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the bodies under the La Paz Agreement and to replace them with a
United States-Mexico environmental treaty and environmental commission.
The second suggestion is to establish a continental North American
Environmental Commission, a commission on the environment with reg-
ulatory authority that includes the ability to establish standards and
enforce them. This would provide teeth behind regulation in the border
region. (The La Paz Agreement defines the border region as 100 kilometers
on each side of the border, sixty miles south and sixty miles north.)
What, then, are the prospects? Both governments have resisted the
idea of new treaties parallel with NAFTA. They have resisted the es-
tablishment of international commissions that would intrude upon the
sovereignty of each country. Rather, the two nations have responded by
saying, "We have institutions that are working very well and have long
established traditions, but also have insufficient power."
The two governments have come up with the so-called Integrated Border
Environmental Plan ("IBEP").5 This would provide for more coordi-
nation, cooperation, communication, and funding. It would encourage
existing institutions to be more aggressive in building sewage treatment
plants, in providing clean-up facilities, and in tracking hazardous wastes
and making sure those wastes are repatriated.
In addition, there are proposals under consideration by both govern-
ments for a United States-Mexico Environmental Agreement which would
be something like a super La Paz Agreement consultative mechanism. It
would not be limited to the United States-Mexico border; rather, it would
provide for cooperation and communication between the two countries
and their environmental protection agencies. It would not, however, be
regulatory.
There is also the proposal by the environmental ministers of the United
States, Mexico, and Canada for the establishment of a North American
Environmental Commission to improve cooperation among the three
countries. Thus, the response to criticisms by environmental groups has
been for an integrated environmental plan that would provide for more
funding and more communication implemented by a bilateral United
States-Mexico commission and, in addition, a trilateral North American
Commission. None of these commissions would have regulatory or en-
forcement power.
What will we get out of this in the end? We do not have the agreement
yet because it is not signed. Is the environmental community happy? Are
they mollified by these institutional proposals that I have talked about,
which are parallel to NAFTA? I think the jury is still out.
If I were to guess, my hunch is that the three countries will not agree
to new treaties with new commissions with regulatory powers. They will
go ahead on the path that the present administrations have undertaken;
that is, to keep the present institutions, but to coordinate, communicate,
5. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S.
BORDER AREA (1991).
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and cooperate better, and to put more money into the environmental
clean-up in the border area. Therefore, the environmental community
will not get what they have been asking for. They will not have envi-
ronmental commissions with regulatory power. There will be a lot of
communication. There will be more funding. There will be provisions in
the treaty itself. The environmental community probably has achieved
quite a bit in the treaty in terms of the institutional arrangements, but
that may not be enough.
DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS AFTER NAFTA
QUESTION: The North American Free Trade Agreement, Article
2005(4),' provides that in any dispute rising under Subchapter 7(B) or
Chapter 9 concerning a measure to protect the environment which raises
factual issues concerning the environment, the complaining party shall
have "recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under" NAFTA
if the responding party "requests in writing that the matter be considered
under" NAFTA Article 2005(4)(b).' Does this always preclude the use
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") dispute
settlement mechanisms on environmental issues if the respondent requests?
In addition, would this have precluded the use of GATT in the tuna
embargo case if the United States had objected?
ANSWER, Mr. Gaines: The provisions that allow the respondent to bring
the case back to NAFTA are limited to the standards related measures
and the international environmental agreements. Specifically, the tuna/
dolphin issue would not come under any of the provisions mentioned in
Article 2005(4). Therefore, if a complaining party originally went to
GATT on a wildlife conservation issue, it would presumable stay in
GATT.
QUESTION: NAFTA Chapter 7(B) appears to have been influenced by
the GATT Sanitary and Phytosanitary Dunkel Draft.' But unlike GATT,
the party facing an extreme environmental protectionist measure would
have no remedy other than NAFTA's Chapter 20. Is that right? And
what would happen to it?
ANSWER, Mr. Gaines: Whether under the GATT or NAFTA, the rem-
edies under the applicable trade agreement are trade-related remedies. If
a party's environmental measures are challenged under NAFTA, what
does the complaining party have to do to demonstrate inconsistency with
NAFTA? Is there any basis for challenging a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure? Yes, there is. We have tried to clarify the scientific tests and
make it clear that parties can take environmental and health measures.
They can establish their own levels of protection, which can be more
protective than international standards, but they do have to have some
scientific basis for the measure. If there is no scientific basis for the
measure, then it may still be subject to challenge.
I think there is another related question, "What is this scientific basis
test?" ' 4 Does it mean that, if the challenging party says that my science
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Id. art. 2005(4)(b).
3. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, UR-91-0185, GATT Secretariat (Dec. 20, 1991).
4. "Scientific basis" is defined as "a reason based on data or information derived using scientific
methods." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 724.
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is better than your science, this allows him to prevail? What we have
tried to make clear in this context is that the trade dispute settlements
are not to become a forum for resolving scientific controversies. If there
is a scientific basis, if there is some basis in data developed through
scientific methods that supports the measure that is being taken by the
country, you can have ten times as much evidence or ten Nobel scientists
that say, "No, that's not true," and that is still not going to be enough.
If the scientific basis is no longer there, however, a standard can be
challenged. This is mentioned in the Chapter on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures. A party cannot maintain a standard where there no
longer is a scientific basis for relying on it. For example, if you relied
on a 1950 study, and there is a 1980 study that completely repudiates
the earlier study, your scientific basis is no longer there. But if there is
some current basis in the scientific data for the measure, it will stand
even though it does not represent the current consensus.
QUESTION: Mexico City and Washington, D.C. are far removed from
the border. Why waste time and money on the border environment when
the real problem is that the environment in which most of the people
of Mexico and the United States live is contaminated through unregulated
trade in goods and services?
ANSWER, Prof. Utton: That question, "Why waste money on the
border?" is a relative question. I would certainly agree that the envi-
ronmental problems are more severe in Mexico City than they are in
many of the border areas. People in the border area, however, say that
no environmental problem, no sewage problem, exists until politicians
can smell it in Washington, D.C. and Mexico, D.F.
I would point out that, according to the Environmental Protection
Agency figures, the population in the border region doubled between the
1980 census and the 1990 census. There has been a staggering rate of
growth, and there have been staggering sewage problems, in places like
Nogales, Tijuana, and Mexicali. Those cities are by no means small cities.
The combined population of Tijuana and San Diego is about 4,000,000;
the combined city of El Paso and Juarez is 1,500,000 to 2,000,000;
Mexicali has more than 1,000,000 people. There are four population
centers on the border that are larger than the city of San Francisco, and
the rapid population and economic growth in the area creates trans-
boundary impacts in a way that pollution in Mexico City and Washington,
D.C. does not. Those are problems that have the capability for seriously
irritating the relations between the two countries.
ANSWER, Prof. Gaines: One of the issues that has come up in the
congressional debate over NAFTA is how to fund infrastructure devel-
opment and environmental improvements in the border area. There have
been various proposals for dedicated funding, either by not reducing
tariffs so quickly under NAFTA or by applying a surcharge and dedicating
that fund to the border area. The position of the Bush Administration
on that went to the point raised in the question. Each country has a
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multitude of very important issues to deal with. Border environmental
improvements are extremely important. In fact, the Bush Administration
requested $240 million for fiscal year 1993 to carry out the American
part of the Integrated Border Environmental Plan;5 Congress decided to
cut that amount amount substantially.
5. Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (U.S.E.P.A., Feb. 1992).
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